SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected Balance by Lee, W. Brewster, III
Cornell Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 6 August 1983 Article 5
SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a
Congressionally Selected Balance
W. Brewster Lee III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. Brewster Lee III, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected Balance, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 914 (1983)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol68/iss6/5
SEC TENDER OFFER TIMING RULES: UPSETTING A
CONGRESSIONALLY SELECTED BALANCE
In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act' to protect shareholders
of companies subject to tender offers.2 The Act amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to require bidders to disclose certain information
relating to the offer.3 Congress sought to protect the shareholders pri-
marily through disclosure requirements and took care not to tip the bal-
ance of regulation in favor of either the target management or the
bidder.4 To give shareholders time to analyze the bidder's disclosure
1 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 40-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 12-14, 15 U.S.C. § 78/-78n (1982)).
2 The securities laws and agency regulations fail to define the term "tender offer," al-
though congressional reports accompanying the Williams Act contain a general description.
See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE.CONG. & AD.
NEwS 2911-12 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711]; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 550]. Since 1976, the agency has often consid-
ered promulgating a definition but has not adopted one to date. SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15,548 (Feb. 5, 1969), 16 SEC Docket 973 (1978-79) ("[I]n recognition of the
dynamic nature of tender offers and the need for the Williams Act to be interpreted flexibly
in a manner consistent with its purposes, the Commission affirms its position that a definition
of the term 'tender offer' is neither appropriate nor necessary at this time.") [hereinafter cited
as SEC Rel. 15,548]; see also Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game.- The
Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 408, 426-38 (1980) (discussing 1979 proposed statutory definition of "tender offer")
[hereinafter cited as Fogelson].
Congress was concerned that cash tender offers forced shareholders to respond to offers
without adequate information. Prior to the Williams Act, the bidder could proceed with his
offer without disclosing his identity, financing, or plans for the company if the acquisition
proved successful. This secretive atmosphere caused a rush to tender that Congress sought to
control through the Williams Act. S. REP. No. 550,supra, at 2-4; H.R. REP. No. 171 1,supra,
at 2-4; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982) (Act reflects Congress's desire
"to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary information but also by
withholding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the
exercise of an informed choice").
3 The Williams Act added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d) and (e), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) (1982), and § 14(d), (e), and (f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(0 (1982), to regulate
acquisitions of substantial blocks and tender offers of equity securities. Under § 13(d), a per-
son who acquired more than 10% of a class of equity securities of a company had to file
Schedule 13D with the agency, the company, and the appropriate exchanges, within 10 days
of the acquisition, and had to make prompt amendments. Schedule 13D required informa-
tion on the party's identity, background, source of funding, share holdings in the target com-
pany, relevant agreements, and sometimes, future plans. Section 13(e) regulated issuer tender
offers. Section 14(d) required bidders to have an information statement on file with the SEC
when commencing its offer. Section 14(d)(4) permitted the agency to regulate solicitations or
recommendations made by the management of the target corporation to its shareholders.
Section 14(e), an antimanipulative provision, granted the SEC rulemaking authority. See in-
fia notes 13, 99-107 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 79-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional fear of
"tipping the balance of regulation" and the effects of delay upon tender offers. Though any
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materials, Congress enacted two important substantive5 timing
provisions.
Section 14(d)(5) allows shareholders to withdraw tendered securi-
ties during the first seven calendar days of the tender offer period.6 Sec-
tion 14(d) (6) requires that when a partial tender offer 7 is oversubscribed
during the first ten calendar days, "the securities taken up shall be taken
up [by the bidder] pro rata . . . according to the number of securities
deposited by each depositor." 8 The withdrawal and pro rata rights
thereby effectively established minimum tender offer periods of seven
days for an "any and all" 9 tender offer and ten days for a partial tender
offer. Congress amended the Williams Act in 1970,10 broadening its
coverage" and augmenting the SEC's rulemaking authority under sec-
regulation at all favors incumbent management, Congress sought to minimize the impact of
the legislation and to avoid undue interference.
5 Congress labeled § 14(d)(5), (d)(6), and (d)(7) "substantive" to distinguish them from
those sections governing disclosure. Section 14(d)(7), the "best price" rule, is not relevant to
the subject matter of this Note, therefore this Note will refer only to the withdrawal and
proration provision as the substantive timing provisions.
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(5) (1982), establishes
the withdrawal period. It provides:
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer . . . may be withdrawn by
. . . the depositor at any time until the expiration of seven days after the time.
definitive copies of the offer. . . are first published or sent or given to security
holders, and at any time after sixty days from the date of the original tender
offer or request or invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise pre-
scribe by rules, regulations, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
7 For a general definition of "partial tender offer" see Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); infra note 8.
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982), provides:
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders,
for less than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, and where a
greater number of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten days
after copes of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or
given to security holders than such person is bound or willing to take up and
pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata,
disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities deposited by
each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to securities
deposited within ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration of-
fered to security holders, as described in paragraph (7), is first published or
sent or given to security holders.
9 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. In an "any and all" tender offer, a bidder
offers to take all of the equity securities of a class. Such an offer was not subject to § 14(d)(6)'s
10-day pro rata rule and therefore was limited only by § 14(d)(5)'s seven-day withdrawal
period. On the eighth day the bidder could purchase all the tendered stock.
10 Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (amending Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(e) (1982)) [here-
inafter cited as 1970 Amendments].
I I Congress extended the requirements of the Williams Act to include tender offers in-
volving insurance company stock and stock for stock exchange offers. Congress also lowered
the percentage of stock holding needed to activate the disclosure requirements from 10% to
5%. See supra note 3 (discussion of § 13(d)). This expanded coverage was intended to "pro-
vide public disclosure of impending takeovers at a more meaningful level." S. REP. No. 1125,
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tion 14(e)12 to prevent "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" prac-
tices in tender offers.1 3
In 1979, the SEC promulgated rules' 4 extending the withdrawal
period to fifteen business days,' 5 establishing a twenty business day min-
imum tender offer period,' 6 and allowing bidders to voluntarily extend
pro rata rights for the full tender offer period.' 7 In 1982, the SEC
adopted revised rule 14d-8, requiring bidders to accept on a pro rata
basis all securities tendered in response to a partial tender offer.'8 The
rule expressly contradicts the statutory requirement of section 14(d)(6)
that the pro rata acceptance period expire at the end of the tenth day
following commencement of the tender offer. Each of these rules raises
questions about the SEC's authority to adjust the statutory timing re-
quirements struck by Congress between the target management and the
bidder.
This Note analyzes the SEC's authority under the Williams Act to
promulgate substantive timing regulations. First, it presents the SEC's
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1125]; H.R. REP. No. 1655,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWs 5025, 5027 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1655].
12 S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 11, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 1655, supra note 11, at 2.
13 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation
for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor
of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this subsection, by nules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonaby designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are faudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (emphasis added to indicate 1970 addition).
14 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,384 (Nov. 29, 1979), 18 SEC Docket
1053 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 16,384].
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1983).
16 Id § 240.14e-1.
17 Id § 240.14d-8 [hereinafter cited as old rule 14d-8].
18 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,336 (Dec. 28, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 [hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 19,336]. This
section provides:
Notwithstanding the pro rata provisions of Section 14(d) (6) of the Act, if any
person makes a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, for less than
all of the outstanding equity securities of a class, and if a greater number of
securities are deposited pursuant thereto than such person is bound or willing
to take up and pay for, the securities taken up and paid for shall be taken up
and paid for as nearly as may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to
the number of securities deposited by each depositor during the period such ofer,
request or invitation remains open.
SEC Rel. 19,336, at 57,680 (emphasis added); see also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 18,761 (May 25, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 24,338 (1982) (release proposing revised rule 14d-8)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 18,761]. The rule was adopted over the dissents of SEC Chair-
man Shad and Commissioner Treadway. SEC Rel. 19,336, supra, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,680-81)
(1982).
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position regarding its authority to promulgate these rules.1 9 Second, the
Note outlines fundamental aspects of both administrative rulemaking
theory and judicial review of administrative regulations.20 Finally, it
examines the legislative history,2 1 administrative implementation, 22 and
judicial interpretation of the Williams Act.2 3 The Note demonstrates
that although policy considerations may support these new rules, the
SEC lacks the authority to promulgate them, particularly revised rule
14d-8. 24 It proposes that Congress eliminate the uncertainty surround-
ing the SEC's rulemaking authority either by delegating specific author-
ity to the SEC to repromulgate these rules or by clearly removing the
statutory timing provisions from agency control.
I
THE SEC's POSITION
In 1979, "in response to serious concerns that . . . security holders
• . . lacked sufficient time and information to make important invest-
ment decisions,"'25 the SEC revised the disclosure statements, extended
the withdrawal period to fifteen days, and established a minimum
tender offer period of twenty business days.2 6 The SEC has since as-
serted that newly developed practices undermine the effectiveness of the
1979 revisions.27 In particular, the agency asserts that partial tender
offers with ten-day proration periods force shareholders to resolve "inor-
dinately complex investment decisions" hastily.28 Consequently, in
May of 1982, the SEC proposed revised rule 14d-8 to achieve the "goal
19 See infra notes 25-39, 44-45 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 40-43, 46-77 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 79-112 and accompanying text. The Note also examines the 1975 Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act as it bears on this subject.
22 See infra notes 114-45 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text. Commissioner James Treadway lik-
ened the agency's uncertain authority to "standing in a quagmire and attempting a
slamdunk." Commission Divided in Decision to Extend Partial Tender Offr Proration Period, THE
SEC TODAY No. 82-241, at 2 (Dec. 16, 1982).
25 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,338-39.
26 SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14. The SEC also established an exemption to § 14(d) (6)
allowing bidders to voluntarily lengthen the proration period. See infra notes 126-30 and ac-
companying text. In providing this exemption the SEC implicitly took the position that
§ 14(d)(6) merely established a minimum proration period. The legislative history behind the
section precludes extension by the SEC. See infra notes 78-113 and accompanying text. Con-
gress, however, never addressed the issue of a voluntary exemption. No proration period at all
allows a bidder to buy the stock as it is tendered with the result that most bidders would not
grant proration rights beyond the required minimum.
27 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
28 Id. The SEC also expressed concern about "the growing use by bidders of'two-step'
offers that combine a partial cash tender offer with an offer of the securities of the bidder,
usually in a subsequent. . . merger .... Id. The SEC illustrated the complexity of tender
offers in the post-1979 revision period by referring to "the three way bidding contest for con-
trol of Conoco, Inc. by Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Mobil
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of informed decisionmaking underlying the minimum tender offer pe-
riod adopted under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act." 29
When the SEC first published the 1979 rules for comment in 1976,
it cited sections 14(e) and 23(a) for authority. 30 Ironically, that proposal
contained a caveat against tipping the congressionally determined bal-
ance in favor of either the tender offeror or the target management.3 1
When the SEC made its final proposal of the 1979 rules, it again paid
lip-service to the goal of neutrality. 32
In May 1982, the SEC, relied primarily on the rulemaking author-
ity contained in section 14(e) in proposing a full-length pro rata rule to
ensure the effectiveness of the 1979 timing rules.33 Despite congressional
rejection of the full length pro rata proposal in 1968, "the [SEC] be-
lieve[d] that in amending Section 14(e) in 1970 to give the Commission
additional rulemaking authority, Congress recognized that the statutory
scheme established in 1968 was inadequate to deal with continuously
evolving tender offer practices. . . . -34 The agency also noted that sec-
tion 23(a), which grants it the "power to make such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this title," provided rulemaking authority to adopt the full length pro
rata rule.35
In a three-to-two decision, the SEC adopted revised rule 14d-8 in
December 1982.36 The majority's only mention of the controversy sur-
Corporation, in which there were nine proration dates and six separate proration pools." Id.
at 24,339 n.17.
Although multiple proration pools added to the complexity of the shareholder's decision,
they were contemplated by Congress during the enactment of the Williams Act. See Jacobs v.
G. Heileman Brewing Co., 551 F. Supp. 639 (D. Del. 1982). InJacobs, Pabst Brewing Com-
pany charged that multiple proration pools of G. Heileman Brewing Company violated
§ 14(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by "discriminating in favor of those
who have tendered [into the first pool]," and cited SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, for sup-
port. The court held that multiple proration pools do not violate the Williams Act and cited
S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 10, and H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 2, at 10-11, to
support its decision.
For further discussion in favor of the new proration rule, see Green, Nathan & Gelfond,
The SEC Adopts a More Rational Prorationing Rule, in NEW TECHNIQUES IN ACQUISITIONS &
TAKEOVERS 198 (1983). For further discussion in opposition to the new proration rule, see
Stephenson, Partial Tender Offers; "Front-End Loaded" Transactions,; Election Procedures in "Cash
Election" Mergers, in NEw TECHNIQUES IN AcQuISITIONS & TAKEOVERS 79, 82-113 (1983).
29 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339. The SEC reported that many investors do
not receive tender offer material until late in, or after, the 10-day proration period. SEC Rel.
19,336, supra note 18, at 57,679.
30 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10 SEC Docket 143
(1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 12,676]; see also infra notes 118-25 and accompanying
text.
31 SEC Rel. 12,676, supra note 30, at 145; see also infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
32 SEC Rel. 15,548, supra note 2, at 974; see also infra notes 126-28.
33 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18.
34 Id at 24,339.
35 Id at 24,339 n.10; SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,679 n.2.
36 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18.
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rounding the SEC's authority was in a footnote: "[C]onsider[ing] the
comments received regarding its authority to adopt revised rule 14d-8,
the [SEC] continues to believe that Sections 14(e) and 23(a) provide
such authority. '37 Both dissenting commissioners questioned the SEC
authority.38
II
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RULEMAKING THEORY AND
JUDICIAL REvIEw
The validity of revised rule 14d-8 and the extent of the SEC's au-
thority under sections 14(e) and 23(a) to promulgate other substantive
timing regulations involve questions of administrative law.3 9 A legisla-
ture delegates rulemaking authority to an administrative agency in or-
der to implement policies that the legislature cannot feasibly or
adequately carry out by statute.4° This delegation authorizes the
37 Id at 57,679 n.2. The SEC noted that "41 commentators submitted 42 letters" con-
cerning the proposed full-length proration rule. Id at 57,679 n. 1. These letters are on file in
the SEC Public Reference Room in file No. 57-993. The comment letters that dealt with the
statutory authority for the new rule greatly aided the author of this Note. Of particular
assistance were the following: Comment Letter from the American Bar Ass'n, Sec. of Corp.,
Banking & Bus. Law (July 6, 1982) ("close question"); Comment Letter from the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York (July 12, 1982) (SEC lacks authority; rule tips balance in favor of
"any and all" offers); Comment Letter from Caplin & Drysdale (July 1, 1982) (policy sup-
ports new rule but suggests alternative of making proration period coincide with the 15-day
withdrawal period under rule 14d-7; also suspects that SEC lacks authority to adopt the pro-
posed rule); Comment Letter from Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett (July 2, 1982) (SEC lacks
authority to adopt proposed rule; rule will create problems); Comment Letter from Trout-
man, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore (July 2, 1982) (SEC lacks authority).
38 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,680-81 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting) ("The
Commission's legal authority to extend the statutory proration period is not clear."); id
(Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting) ("[T]he Commission lacks the authority to adopt the rule.").
39 Cf Canadian Pac. Enters. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (reviewing
validity of SEC rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1983), according to standards of Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982)).
40 See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.05 (1958). In explaining the
growth of administrative agencies in government, Professor Davis writes:
A legislative body is at its best in determining the direction of major policy
and in checking and supervising administration. It is ill-suited for handling
masses of detail, or for applying to shifting and continuing problems the ideas
supplied by. . .professional advisers. . . . Gradually our legislative bodies
developed the system of legislating only the main outlines of programs requir-
ing constant attention, and leaving to administrative agencies the tasks of
working out subsidiary policies.
Id at 37; see also G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BROFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
11 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON]:
The principal alternative approaches to reliance on an agency have been for
Congress to impose requirements directly through legislation (e.g., the mini-
mum wage law), or for it to make only a general statement of policy in legisla-
tion and to delegate the working out of detail to the courts (e.g., the Sherman
Act). But for a number of reasons these alternatives have often seemed un-
wise. Congress often prefers not to legislate in detail because of the heavy
burdens such an approach would impose on Congress, the need for frequent
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agency to act in a manner consistent with broad and frequently vague
statutory standards. 4' The nature of the regulated area often requires
the flexibility afforded by administrative agency regulation. 42 On the
other hand, if a legislature is confident that rigid statutory provisions
best serve its purpose, it can limit an agency's discretion through de-
tailed legislation that precludes administrative rulemaking.43 The ten-
sion between these two approaches lies at the heart of the debate over
the validity of the SEC's substantive timing regulations.
While Congress has generally delegated broad rulemaking author-
ity44 to the SEC, its painstaking approach 45 in enacting precise tender
offer timing provisions to serve competing aspects of investor protection,
namely, disclosure of material information without inhibiting tender of-
fers, suggests that these provisions are not subject to broad revision by
the SEC. Moreover, the SEC's reliance upon the grant of additional
rulemaking authority in 1970 is unavailing because no grant of rulemak-
ing authority can authorize an agency to adopt rules that contradict the
plain terms of Congress's previous legislation.
A court faced with a challenge to an administrative regulation
must determine whether the agency acted within its statutory authority
in promulgating the rule.4 6 As statutory interpretation is clearly within
the domain of the court, the breadth of the court's review at this stage
statutory amendments as conditions change, and the frequent presence of
technical matters on which Congress is not knowledgeable.
41 In the past, vague statutory guidance to administrative agencies led to some questions
concerning the constitutionality of such delegations of authority. This so called "non-delega-
tion doctrine" is now generally considered defunct. See K. DAvis, supra note 40, at § 2.01. But
cf. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theogy of Legislative Delegation, 68 'CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7
(1983) (arguing for renewed nondelegation doctrine).
42 See generally 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 40; ROBINSON, supra note 40.
43 See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 616-19 (1944).
44 See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580
(2d Cir. 1979); Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 1966); R.A.
Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962); cf. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION § 1936 (1961) (suggesting that SEC does not have general power to legislate, but is
bound by what is "necessary" within interpretation of specific language of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
45 See infta notes 46-65 and accompanying text; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 14(d)(5), (d)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5), (d)(6) (1982).
46 In his treatise on administrative law, I K. DAvis, supra note 40, § 30.14, Professor
Davis describes the confusion surrounding the proper scope of judicial review of administra-
tive regulations. He also introduces his theory on the causes for the two divergent approaches
to review of administrative regulations: "substituted judgment" and "rational basis."
Arguably, courts are to decide the questions of law, leaving questions of fact, if within
the agency's jurisdiction, to the agency to resolve. The Supreme Court and lower courts,
however, do not follow such a theoretically sound approach.
Professor Davis suggests certain factors that prompt a court in a given case to deviate
from this approach and defer to the agency on questions of law. Three major factors are: (1)
the comparative qualification of the court and agency to decide the particular issue; (2) the
extent to which the legislative body has committed particular problems to administrative or
judicial determination; and (3) the tendency of courts to substitute judgment on broad gener-
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should be very wide.47 An agency's interpretation of the statute it ad-
ministers warrants consideration, but this interpretation should not be
conclusive. 48 Questions of fact, on the other hand, are within the prov-
ince of the agency 49 and upon these issues a court normally should not
substitute its judgment. 50
The Supreme Court recently employed this analysis to overturn ad-
ministrative regulations. In reviewing certain Treasury Regulations in
Rowan Cos. v. United States,5 1 the Court stated: "We consider Treasury
Regulations valid if they 'implement the congressional mandate in some
alizations. The scope ofjudicial review and the deference given by the court to the adminis-
trative determination are also explained by
the court's attitude toward the agency, the degree of thoroughness and impar-
tiality in the agency's performance, the extent of the court's agreement or
disagreement with the administrative determination, the court's interest in
and its appraisal of the importance of the subject matter, alternative demands
upon time and attention of the judges at the particular time, need or lack of
need for judicial bolstering of administrative policy, need for stability of par-
ticular law or policy compared with need for continued fluidity, manner of
presentation of cases through briefs and oral arguments, and fortuities of writ-
ing opinions explaining scope of review in particular cases.
Id at 269.
47 Id § 30.01-.02.
48 In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the Court reviewed the
NLRB's interpretation of the term "employee" to determine the scope of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). After having found that Congress delegated to
the NLRB the authority to interpret the term "employee" in light of their experience in
employment relations, the Court said:
Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation . . . are for the courts to
resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special
duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the question is one of
specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing
court's function is limited.
322 U.S. at 130-31.
49 See generaly 4 K. DAvis, supra note 40, § 30.01-.14.
50 Id
51 452 U.S. 247 (1981). In Rowan Cos., an off-shore drilling company challenged the
Treasury's interpretation of "wages" for the purpose of determining tax liability under the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA). Se Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(a)-I(0, 31.3306(b)-1() (1980). The challenged regula-
tions provided that the value of room and board given to the taxpayer's employees was in-
cludable in the computation of "wages"--the base for taxation under FICA and FUTA. Id
The Treasury Regulation interpreting the definition of "wages" for the purposes of income
tax withholding, however, provided that room and board were not includable in the compu-
tation of "wages." See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l (b) (9) (1980). The taxpayer argued that
Congress intended the term "wages" to have the same meaning for purposes of FICA, FUTA,
and income tax withholding, 452 U.S. at 251, and that the regulations under FICA and
FUTA were invalid. Id at 254.
The Fifth Circuit sustained the validity of the FICA and FUTA regulations, Rowan Cos.
v. United States, 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 247 (1981), reasoning that the
different interpretations of "wages" were not inconsistent, because "wages" served a different
function in different tax acts. 624 F.2d at 706. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
holding that Congress had intended the term "wages" to have the same meaning under FICA
and FUTA as it had for the purposes of income tax withholding. 452 U.S. at 263. The
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reasonable manner.' . . . [W]e look to see whether the regulation har-
monizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its pur-
pose."5 2 The Court noted that where an agency promulgated a
regulation under a general rulemaking provision, and where Congress
has specifically acted, less deference was due than where the "regulation
[is] issued under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term
or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision. '53 The Court
considered three other factors before reaching its determination: (1) the
regulation's contemporaneousness with the statute; (2) the consistency of
the agency's interpretation over time; and (3) subsequent congressional
scrutiny of the regulation. 54
In United States v. Vogel Fertiier Co.,5 5 the Court considered the va-
lidity of another Treasury Regulation.5 6 Having noted that its review
was limited to the determination of whether the regulation reasonably
implemented the congressional mandate, 57 the court added: "this gen-
eral principle of deference while fundamental, only 'sets the framework
for judicial analysis; it does not displace it.' "5s The Court discussed the
lessened deference due to a rule promulgated under general rulemaking
authority,59 and refused to accept the regulation simply "because it
[was] not 'technically inconsistent' with the statutory language. ' 60 The
legislative history guided the Court to the conclusion that the chal-
lenged regulation was invalid.6' Additionally, the Court rejected the
Treasury's argument that the statutory framework was inadequate as
Congress had specifically determined that framework.
6 2
Thus, in determining the extent of an agency's rulemaking power
and the validity of a given rule, a court must first compare the language
of the rule with that of the statute under which it is promulgated. 63 An
challenged regulations were thus invalid, because they "failed] to implement the statutory
definition of wages in a consistent or reasonable manner." Id
52 452 U.S. at 252-53 (citations omitted).
53 Id at 253 (Court "can measure Commissioner's interpretation against specific provi-
sion in the Code. .
54 Id
55 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
56 In Vogel, the Court reviewed the validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a) (3) (1981) (inter-
pretation of "brother-sister controlled group" as used in I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1976)).
57 455 U.S. at 24 (using language almost identical to that used in Rowan Cos.).
58 Id (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973)).
59 Id (quoting Rowan Cos., 425 U.S. at 253).
60 455 U.S. at 26 (though statutory language could support Treasury's interpretation,
regulation must "harmonize. . .with the statute's 'origin and purpose' ") (quoting National
Muffler Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
61 455 U.S. at 26.
62 Id at 34 ("Congress purposefully substituted the mechanical formula of § 1563(a) (2)
for the subjective, case-by-case analysis that had previously prevailed.").
63 "[A]s with any case involving the interpretation of a statute, our analysis must begin
with the language of the statute itself." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979) (citations omitted); see also Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490
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administrative regulation must operate in harmony with,64 and cannot
contradict the terms of, the statute.65 Courts typically read remedial
legislation flexibly, rather than narrowly or strictly, to promote imple-
mentation of congressional purposes. 66 This approach, however, is ap-
propriate only to the extent the legislation tolerates a flexible reading. 67
Although Congress can commit matters to an agency's discretion with
very broad standards for guidance,68 it may also preclude agency
rulemaking by enacting rigidly detailed statutory provisions.69 A court
therefore must examine not only the grant of the authority, but also the
individual provisions of the act to determine if the regulation contra-
dicts any of those provisions. 70
Although a regulation may survive the first stage of judicial review,
a court should not uphold the regulation merely because it is not techni-
cally inconsistent with the language of the statute. A regulation must
also be substantively consistent with the congressional intent of the stat-
ute.71 An agency's rulemaking power is derivative; 72 it does not include
the power to legislate. Even where the legislation grants broad rulemak-
ing powers to any agency, that agency is bound by the specific language
and congressional intent of the legislation. 73 A review of the statute's
legislative history will help a court to determine the congressional intent
F.2d 841, 844 (1974) ("Determining the regulations [sic] consistency with the statute requires
examination of the language of each and of the statutory history and congressional
purpose.").
64 See Ruiz v. Morton, 462 F.2d 818, 822 (1972), aftd, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) ("[A]n ad-
ministrative agency. . . has no power to create a rule or regulation that is out of harmony
with the statutory grant of its authority.") (citations omitted); see also Manhattan Gen. Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (when original regulation was unlawful, regu-
lation as amended became controlling rule).
65 "[A] regulation to the extent it is in direct variance with an unambiguous statutory
provision is clearly void." United States v. Maxwell, 278 F.2d 206, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1960)
(citations omitted).
66 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Tehereprin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
67 See supra note 63; see also Northern Natural Gas v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 134 (8th
Cir. 1960) ("The primary function of a regulation is to interpret an ambiguous statute and
clarify its meaning. If the statute if unambiguous, there is no room for construction. A right clearly
created by statute cannot be taken away by regulation.') (emphasis added).
68 See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 40, §§ 1-6.
69 Id
70 See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("We believe it fundamental
that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act,
and. . . 'we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should]
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " (footnotes omitted))
(quoting United States v. Boisdorie's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) quoted in, Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956)).
71 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72 See I K. DAvis, supra note 40, § 4.03; see also supra notes 43-51, 63-70 and accompany-
ing text.
73 Cf 3 L. Loss, supra note 44.
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and, thus, the propriety of the administrative action. Other indicia of
the validity of regulation include the timing of its release74 and its con-
sistency with related rules.
75
The remainder of this Note will demonstrate that in a challenge to
the SEC's substantive tender offer timing rules a court is likely to find
them invalid because they upset a congressionally mandated balance. 76
III
WILLIAMS ACT TIMING PROVISIONS: A CONGRESSIONALLY
SELECTED BALANCE
In drafting the Williams Act, Congress took extreme care to avoid
favoring either the target management or the tender offeror. As the leg-
islative history of this and subsequent legislation illustrates, Congress de-
sired a neutral balance based on disclosure in tender offers. Both the
SEC and the Supreme Court have recognized that this neutrality lies at
the heart of the Williams Act. 77 Regulations under the Williams Act
that tip this balance, therefore, contravene the congressional mandate.
A. The Legislative History
1. 1968 Hearings and Reports
Congress carefully drafted the substantive timing provisions to
avoid "tipping the balance of regulation" in favor of either bidder or
incumbent management. 78 Congress acted cautiously, 79 knowing that
the withdrawal and pro rata periods can determine the behavior of
tender offer participants. Bidders often favor tender offers over proxy
fights to gain control of a corporation because tender offers often pro-
vide an easier and faster means to accomplish the takeover.8 0 Any regu-
lation causing delay can unbalance the market forces and may
74 A rule adopted contemporaneously with the passage of the statute under which it
operates is generally more persuasive than a rule promulgated later. See 1 K. DAvis, supra
note 40, § 5.04.
75 See United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 393 (1956); Manhattan Gen. Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
76 This review will demonstrate three propositions. First, that Congress intended
§ 14(d)(5) and (d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to establish a minimum tender
offer period, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Second, that rule 14d-7, which extends
the withdrawal period, and rule 14e-1, which establishes a minimum tender offer period, are
of questionable validity. Third, that revised rule 14d-8 is patently invalid.
77 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
78 S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 2, at 4.
79 See generally Takeover Bids: Hearing on HR. 14475, S 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 H. Hearing]; Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and In Corpo-
rate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Current, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 S Hearings].
80 See 1967 S Hearings, supra note 79, at 42 (statement of Sen. Kuchell).
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determine the outcome in a takeover battle.8 1
In the original Senate version, the Williams Act provided for a
seven calendar day withdrawal period and pro rata rights throughout
the tender offer period.8 2 The SEC advocated that both withdrawal
and pro rata rights exist throughout the tender offer period.83 The SEC
also sought a specific grant of rulemaking authority to adjust the prora-
tion period if "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."'8 4 The SEC chairman stressed that only with
broad rulemaking authority could the Commission adequately police
the rapidly evolving techniques employed by both sides in a tender
offer.8 5
Congress, however, did not follow the suggestions of the SEC. In-
stead, it reduced the proration period to ten calendar days8 6 and limited
the withdrawal period to seven calendar days.8 7 Although Congress
granted the SEC some rulemaking authority to act in "special situa-
tions" under the withdrawal provision, section 14(d)(5),88 Congress did
81 See S. REP. No. 550,supra note 2, at 4;see, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256, 1278 & n.49 (5th Cir. 1978) (Congress recognized that delay can impede tender
offer significantly). Commentators, for example, have severely criticized the delay caused by
state takeover laws. See, e.g., Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Eects and Polit-
ical Competeny, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 238 (1977) ("waiting period" and "hearing" provi-
sions in state tender offer legislation primarily serve to discourage tender offers). Full
proration periods delay takeovers by precluding bidders from purchasing any shares until the
end of the tender offer period. The 10-day proration period, by contrast, subjects bidders to
less risk by allowing them to purchase on a first-come, first-served basis after 10 days. The
SEC's extension of the withdrawal period under rule 14d-7 requires bidders to wait 15 days
before making any purchases. The SEC acknowledged in proposing revised rule 14d-8 that
"the longer the proration period . . . the greater the possibility that the bid will be defeated
through defensive tactics of the subject company [e.g., litigation] or higher offers by others."
SEC Rel. 18,761,supra note 18, at 24,338. In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the SEC listed other ways in which delay could shift the
balance to favor target management. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Ami-
cus Curiae at 10 n.8, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see also Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1980) (delay unduly benefits target management,
thereby undermining "market approach" established by Williams Act to protect investors).
82 The original House bill complied fully with the SEC recommendations for full-length
withdrawal and proration periods. The Senate, however, referred the bill to the House with
limited withdrawal and proration periods. This version was adopted by the full Congress.
1968 H. Hearings, supra note 79, at 18; 1967 . Hearings, supra note 79, at 11-12; S. REP. No.
550, supra note 2, at 4-5.
83 1967 S Hearings, supra note 78, at 9-41, 197-98.
84 Id at 38 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission).
85 Id at 30. The SEC gave similar testimony at the hearings on the 1970 amendments.
See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the SEC asserted that congres-
sional delegation of rulemaking authority in § 14(e) was intended to serve this policing func-
tion. See SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
86 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); see also S.
REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 4-5, 10; H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 2, at 10-11.
87 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
88 Congress included a specific grant of rulemaking power in § 14(d)(5), "except as the
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not delegate comparable rulemaking authority within the pro rata pro-
vision, section 14(d)(6).8 9
In large part, the testimony of security industry and academic com-
mentators prompted these changes. 90 Generally, these commentators ar-
gued that full-length withdrawal and pro rata rights would delay tender
offers and thereby give target management time in which to take defen-
sive steps against the successful completion of the takeover.9' This, they
suggested, was unfair to bidders. Additionally, tendering shareholders
risked tying up stock for lengthy periods without knowing what portion,
if any, would be purchased. 92 This uncertainty of outcome could
greatly increase the risk to arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the trading
markets. 93 If government regulation interfered with the flexibility re-
Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or orders as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." However, the reports, accompa-
nying the Act suggest that the SEC could vary the terms of the provision only in "special
situations." S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 1711,supra note 2, at 10.
89 The express delegations of rulemaking authority in other sections of the Williams Act
and the omission of such a provision from § 14(d)(6) strongly suggests that Congress did not
intend to confer such power on the SEC in this area. Cf Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods.,
322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944) (detailed and particular exemptions "preclude their enlargement by
implication"); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1114 (8th Cir. 1973); Aloca
S.S. Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 348 F.2d 756, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
90 S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 4-5.
91 One commentator explained:
[I]f pro rata acceptance is made mandatory for the entire period of the tender
offer, it will cause most investors to delay their decisions for an unnecessarily
long period and thus give the incumbent mangement an unfair time advan-
tage for launching the powerful counteroffensive moves which are available to
it.
1967 S Hearings, supra note 79, at 59 (statement of Professor S.L. Hayes, III, Graduate School
of Business, Columbia University). The officials of the New York Stock Exchange also criti-
cized the SEC's recommendations: "We agree with the remarks at the hearings to the effect
that to allow the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations covering [pro rata periods]
of tender offers would, in all likelihood, cause more problems than it would solve." Id at 93
(statement of Donald L. Calvin and Phillip L. West, Vice Presidents, New York Stock Ex-
change); see also id at 69-86. Other commentators generally agreed with the position of the
New York Stock Exchange. Id at 131, 164, 171 (statement of Ralph S. Saul, President,
American Stock Exchange). In contrast, officials from the American Stock Exchange specifi-
cally recommended that Congress grant the SEC rulemaking authority to cover proration
rights. Id at 100.
92 Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange, stated that "the unlim-
ited pro rata period in H.R. 14475 will work to the detriment of the investing public," and
described some of the problems he foresaw that would attend an unlimited pro rata period.
1968 H Heaings, supra note 46, at 30.
93 The President of the New York Stock Exchange hypothesized:
Market disruptions would also be more likely under a requirement that
all tender offers must be made on a pro rata basis. . . . [Ilt would [increase]
both the length of tender offers and the time in which large blocks of stock
[are] tied up. Withdrawing a sizable amount of a company's outstanding se-
curities from the market for an extended period can drastically reduce the
supply of stock available for trading. A limited supply of stock can produce
abnormal price fluctuations.
1967 S. Hean'ngs, supra note 79, at 90 (statement of G. Keith Furston, President, New York
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quired to structure offers and counteroffers, then they would begin to
replace natural market forces in determining the outcome of tender of-
fers. 94 The commentators pointed to the New York Stock Exchange's
ten-day proration rule as a workable compromise for the more trouble-
some pro rata question.95
Moreover, tender offers were widely favored at that time due to a
general belief that they benefitted stockholders by offering a premium
for their stock over the prevailing market price96 and by providing an
efficient means to oust incompetent management.9 7 In light of this legis-
lative history, changes to the timing provisions, other than a "special
situation" extension of the withdrawal period, upset a congressionally
selected balance and are of doubtful validity.
2. 1970 Amendments: Hearings and Reports
Two years after passing the Williams Act, Congress amended it to
broaden the reach of the legislation.9 8 Of particular importance is the
addition of a second sentence to section 14(e). This addition gave the
SEC rulemaking authority to "define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative." 99 The SEC now asserts that Congress, in amending
the Act, recognized the inadequacy of the statutory scheme enacted two
Stock Exchange); see also 1968 I-. Hearings, supra note 79, at 50 ("Market disruptions would
• ..be more likely under a requirement that all tender offers be made on a pro rata basis for
the entire period.") (statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock
Exchange).
94 See 1967 S Hearings, supra note 79, at 77 (testimony of Donald L. Calvin, Vice Presi-
dent, New York Stock Exchange).
95 Id; id at 62 (statement of Professor S.L. Hayes, III, Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University).
96 Senator Javits recognized on the floor of the Senate that "[s]ometimes stockholders do
very well because of tenders .... ." 113 CONG. REG. 24,665 (1967). Senator Kuchel, as a
solitary voice, criticized tender offers. Id at 857-58.
97 S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 3. Many commentators have recently criticized
tender offers for tying-up large amounts of money that should be spent on capital investment
to create more jobs. See Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to Re-registration of Redeemed Securities
Jan.-Junel SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 543, at A-13 (Mar. 5, 1980) (SEC Chairman
Williams testifies before House Small Business Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Subcomm.
on Feb. 27, 1980). Other commentators rejoin that tender offers permit the "market forces"
to allocate resources most efficiently by giving them to the party offering the highest consider-
ation, for whom, presumably, the assets are most valuable. H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1976) ("The very possibility of a successful tender offer may exert a pro-competi-
tive influence in the market place by keeping incumbent management 'on their toes,' and by
forcing them to keep their firm efficient and successful."); see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74
(1981) (prospect of hostile tender offers effectively monitors work of incumbent management
and, in process, benefits all parties); Fischel, Eficient Capital Market Theog: The Market for Cor-
porate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978).
98 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
99 1970 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 5. For the text of § 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, see supra note 13.
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years earlier 0 0 and authorized the agency to change the substantive
timing of tender offers, even though such changes alter the previously
selected balance.' 0 ' The legislative history of the 1970 amendments,
however, offers, at best, only ambiguous support for the SEC assertion.
Remarks made by Senator Williams at the opening of the 1970
amendment hearings shed some light on the nature and scope of section
14(e) rulemaking authority.
The techniques currently being used in these offers have become in-
creasingly sophisticated and they change rapidly. This is particularly
true when the takeover is resisted by incumbent management ...
Claims and counterclaims, charges and countercharges are
hurled back and forth. Efforts are made to influence the price of the
securities involved.
The bill before us would add to the Commission's rulemaking
power and enable it to deal promptly and with flexibility with this
rapidly changing problem. 102
The remaining legislative history of section 14(e), however, contains lit-
tle reference to the scope of the rulemaking authority Congress intended
to delegate to the SEC and does not address "specifically its effect on or
relation to Section 14(d)(6) and the express, unambiguous 10 day period
contained therein."10 3 The reports accompanying the bill describe con-
gressional intent in the amendment in a single sentence: "The purpose
of this provision is to allow the Commission to deal more effectively with
the devices sometimes employed on both sides in contested tender
offers."' 10
4
The emphasis on administrative flexibility in the face of the sophis-
ticated and rapidly changing tender offer techniques represents a typical
delegation of authority in deference to agency expertise. 10 5 No evidence
suggests that the amendment granted the SEC authority to adopt regu-
lations that not only contradict the unambiguous terms of the statute
but also upset the congressionally selected balance contained in sections
14(d)(5) and 14(d)(6). It would be anomalous for Congress first to ex-
100 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
101 Id at 24,338 (Recognizing that a longer proration period enhances "the possibility
that the bid will be defeated").
102 Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the Securities Act Exemp-
lions for Small Businessmen: Hearing on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970S
Hearings]; see also 116 CONG. REc. 3024 (1970) ("The Commission must be given full
rulemaking powers in order to deal with these rapidly changing problems.") (statement of
Sen. Williams).
103 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,681 (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting).
104 S. REP. No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1125]; H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5025, 5028 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REi'. No. 1655].
105 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 40; 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 40, § 1.
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tend the substantive timing requirements to tender offers not previously
covered by the Williams Act 0 6 and then, in the same legislation, to dele-
gate authority to the SEC to retract the same requirements.1 0 7 The
Commission asserts that Congress granted it "full rulemaking authority"
in 1970,108 yet the timing provisions of the Williams Act remained un-
changed and the legislative history of section 14(e) cannot support the
SEC's broad interpretation.
3. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
Before the SEC adopted any regulations to alter the substantive
timing provisions of the Williams Act, Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act.10 9 The legislative history of this 1975 Act undermines the
SEC's argument that in 1970 Congress considered the statutory scheme
of 1968 to be inadequate and authorized the SEC to alter the timing
schedule of sections 14(d)(5) and 14(d)(6).
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires corporations to notify the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Justice Department before acquiring
control of another corporation and, under certain conditions, to suspend
their merger activities for a limited period of time. Congress hoped that
the notification and waiting period requirements would give "the gov-
ernment antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect
and investigate large mergers of questionable legality before they are
consummated."' 10 The Act established a thirty day premerger waiting
period for most mergers. For cash tender offers, however, a "special,
shortened, 21-day waiting period is provided. . . because of the unique
time constraints involved in such mergers.""'
In describing the provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the com-
mittee report directly addresses the Williams Act timing provisions gov-
erning cash tender offers:
[I]t is clear that this short waiting period was founded on congressional
concern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target firm's in-
cumbent management, and permit them to frustrate many pro-com-
petitive cash tenders. This ten-day waiting period thus underscores the
basic purpose of the Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy to-
wards cash tender offers, by avoiding lengthly [sic] delays that might
discourage their chances for success. "2
106 See supra notes 10-11.
107 Accord Comment Letter of Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, supra note 37.
108 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
109 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Hart-Scott-Rodino Act].
11o H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 1373].
''I Id. at6.
112 Id at 12 (emphasis added).
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In 1975 Congress evidently believed that the withdrawal and proration
periods had effectively established a minimum tender offer period. Con-
gress's caution in imposing the Hart-Scott-Rodino requirements on top
of those already required by the Williams Act strongly suggests that it
considered the Williams Act timing provisions to be not only adequate,
but also subject to revision only by the legislature." 13
B. The Administrative Implementation
In July 1968, the SEC adopted "temporary" rules and regulations
to implement the recently enacted Williams Act.' '4 The adopted rules
and regulations were exclusively oriented toward disclosure. 15 For ex-
ample, Regulation 14D required bidders to file a completed information
statement with the SEC before commencing a tender offer. 1 6 In 1970,
the SEC amended these temporary rules to implement the changes
wrought by the 1970 amendments. 1 7
The SEC released its first comprehensive rulemaking proposals for
tender offers under sections 14(e) and 23(a) in August 1976.118 In this
release, the SEC emphasized that "any efforts to benefit investors in this
area must be made without tipping the balance of regulation in favor of
either the bidder or the subject company." ' 1 9 Yet the SEC proposed
regulations that significantly alter the congressionally selected bal-
113 Se Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 638 (1982) (White, J., plurality) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 1373, supra note 110, to support congressional affirmance of Williams Act's selected
balance).
'14 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8,370 (July 30, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 11,015
(1968) [hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 8,370]. This release introduced Schedule 13D, the infor-
mation statement that persons acquiring more than 10% (as originally drafted) of any equity
security must file with the SEC, the issuer company, and the appropriate stock exchange.
Rule 14d-1 required bidders in tender offers to file Schedule 13D. The SEC also presented
Schedule 14D, the information statement that the management of the target corporation
must file before making any recommendations to its shareholders regarding the tender offer,
as well as rules governing the filing procedure. The agency also adopted rule 13e-l, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-1 (1982), governing an issuer's purchases of its own securities subject to a tender
offer. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 8,391 (Aug. 30, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 13,036
(1968), 8,510 (Jan. 31, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 2354 (1969), and 8,556 (Mar. 24, 1969), 34 Fed.
Reg. 6,101 (1969) contain subsequent amendments to these temporary rules.
115 Although the rules required that no bidder could make a tender offer without filing
Schedule 13D, these rules did not regulate the actual terms of the tender offer. See SEC Rel.
8,370, supra note 114, at 11,015-16. Thus, the rules only governed disclosure and, unlike sub-
stantive timing rules, did not regulate economic aspects of the offer.
116 Id at 11,016.
117 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9,060 (Jan. 18, 1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 976
(1971). The SEC changed the filing requirement rules to lower the §§ 13(d) and 14(d) "trig-
ger" from 10% to 5%, to include insurance company equity stock under the Williams Act, and
to include "stock for stock" exchanges. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
118 SEC Rel. 12,676, supra note 30. For a discussion of § 23(a) see injra notes 182-88 and
accompanying text.
119 SEC Rel. 12,676, supra note 30, at 143 (paraphrasing S. REP. No. 550,supra note 2, at
3 and H.R. REP. No. 1711,supra note 2, at 4).
19831 , TIMING RULES
ance. 120 The rules included: (1) a fifteen business day minimum tender
offer period; 12 1 (2) a ten business day withdrawal period; 122 and (3) an
exemption from section 14(d) (6) to permit bidders to voluntarily extend
the proration period for the length of the tender offer.123 Ultimately,
the SEC only adopted rules governing disclosure.' 24 In the adopting
release, the agency again acknowledged that it must not tip the balance
between bidder and subject company, and it left as proposals those sub-
stantive regulations that would have adjusted the withdrawal and pro-
ration periods. 125
Two years later the SEC withdrew the unadopted 1976 proposals
and introduced another set of regulations along with proposed amend-
ments to existing regulations.' 26 The agency stated that
[the new] proposals are necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors because of the increased
occurrence of tender offers; their impact on securities markets and on
corporate control; the dynamic natures of these transactions; and the
need to ensure a balance [between the bidder and the target manage-
ment] while providing disclosure and substantive protections to share-
holders .... 127
Once again the SEC acknowledged the limits of its authority and stated
that its primary objective under the Williams Act was "to provide .inves-
tor protection in takeover situations rather than to regulate tender offers
as an economic phenomenon."'' 28 Nevertheless, the SEC adopted sub-
120 The SEC acted to "insure that investors have an adequate opportunity to consider
communications from the bidder as well as the subject company in deciding whether to sell,
tender or hold part or all of their securities . . . ." SEC Rel. 12,676, supra note 30, at 144.
The SEC also proposed rule 14d-6 governing integration of purchases of securities by the
bidder "before the commencement of the tender offer or after its termination." Id at 147.
This proposed integration rule has not been adopted.
121 Id at 150 (proposed rule 14e-2).
t22 Id at 147 (proposed rule 14d-5).
123 Id at 148 (proposed rule 14d-8 "is designed to resolve any doubts among practitioners
that a bidder can extend pro rata acceptance rights for the entire length of the tender offer
period without" transgressing § 14(d)(6)).
124 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (Aug. 2, 1977), 12 SEC Docket 1256
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SEC Rel. 13,787]. In this release, the SEC adopted Schedule 14D-
1, a new tender offer statement, and amended the rules governing filing and disclosure
requirements.
125 The SEC announced that, following a review of these proposals, it anticipated taking
further rulemaking action. Id at 1,257.
126 SEC Rel. 15,548, supra note 2.
127 Id at 973.
128 Regulation Under Federal Banking and SecuriTies Laws of Persone Involved in Corporate Take-
overs: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
87 (1976) (statement of Phillip Loomis, Comm'r, Securities Exchange Commission). An in-
teresting exchange occurred during Commissioner Loomis's testimony:
The Chairman (Senator Proxmire): In your statement you say the SEC is not
empowered to regulate tender offers as an economic phenomenon and that
the SEC's regulation is limited to the extent necessary to accomplish the pur-
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stantive regulations1 2 9 that alter the statutory timing provisions and
thereby affect the economics of tender offers.130
These substantive rules included a twenty business day minimum
tender offer period,' 3 1 a fifteen business day withdrawal period, 132 and a
voluntary extension of the pro rata rights. 133 The SEC adopted these
provisions, however, amid controversy. Commentators questioned
whether the SEC had the statutory rulemaking authority to adopt pro-
visions that arguably transcend disclosure and supersede the statutory
framework. 134 For example, "[c]ertain commentators questioned the
Commission's authority to extend the withdrawal period beyond that
provided in Section 14(d)(5)."' 35 The SEC relied on a specific grant of
rulemaking authority contained within the withdrawal period provision,
section 14(d)(5), to extend the withdrawal period to fifteen days. 136
Congressional reports accompanying the Williams Act, however, suggest
that the agency lacks the authority to extend the period except in "spe-
cial situations."' 3 7 Moreover, although Congress did not mandate a
minimum tender offer period per se, the seven calendar day withdrawal
pose of investor protection . . . . Now, that phrase "in the public interest"
implies the SEC's authority is broader than the goal of investor protection.
Mr. Loomis: As I recall that relates to disclosures. We can require whatever
disclosure is necessary, but I don't think we can go much beyond disclosure.
The Chairman: I don't disagree with that.
Id at 126-27.
129 SEC Rel. 15,548, supra note 2. In this release the SEC divided the proposed rules into
four categories: filing requirements, dissemination provisions, disclosure requirements, and
substantive regulatory provisions. Id at 973. The substantive rules included: rule 14e-1,
requiring that tender offers remain open for 30 business days; rule 14d-7, extending the with-
drawal period to 15 business days; rule 14d-8, integrating certain of the bidder's purchases of
target company stock other than from the tender offer; rule 14d-9, creating a voluntary ex-
emption from § 14(d)(6); and rule 14e-2, regulating trading in shares prior to the announce-
ment of the tender offer if traded on the basis of nonpublic material information "that
enables the [purchaser] to know. . . that the bidder will make a tender offer." Id at 1009.
130 SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14.
131 The SEC amended rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1983), to require a 20 business
day tender offer period rather than the proposed 30 business days in response to criticism that
a 30-day period was unnecessarily and unfairly long. SEC Rel. No. 16,384, supra note 14, at
1071; see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
132 SEC Rel. 16,384,supra note 14, at 1066. Rule 14d-7, extending the withdrawal period
to 15 business days, is now codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1983).
'33 SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14, at 1067-68. Proposed rule 14d-9 governing pro rata
rights was renumbered as rule 14d-8 (now replaced by revised rule 14d-8) and was codified at
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983). Proposed rules 14d-8 and 14e-2 were not adopted. SEC Rel.
16,384, supra note 14, at 1072.
134 See SEC Rel. 16,384,supra note 14, at 1063. For specific comments in response to SEC
Rel. 15,548, supra note 2, see file No. S7-770, SEC Public Reference Room.
135 SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14, at 1067.
136 Id; cf. id at 1073 ("The Commission notes, however, that Section 14(d)(5) expressly
grants the authority to vary the statutory periods 'as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.' ") (quoting § 14(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).
137 S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 2, at 10.
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and ten calendar day proration provisions effectively accomplished this
goal. 13 8 Thus, the SEC's adoption of a twenty business day minimum
tender offer period in rule 14e-1 arguably transgresses the congressional
framework established in 1968.139
In May 1982, the SEC proposed mandatory pro rata rights
throughout the tender offer period "[n]otwithstanding the pro rata pro-
visions of Section 14(d)(6) of the Act. . . ."14 This proposal, revising
rule 14d-8, was promulgated pursuant to the SEC's alleged "full
rulemaking authority,"' 4 ' rather than under a specific grant of author-
ity. 14 2 The SEC acknowledged that in 1968 Congress enacted a ten-day
pro rata period and denied SEC requests for pro rata rights throughout
the tender offer period and for specific pro rata rulemaking authority.143
Nonetheless, the SEC adopted revised rule 14d-8,144 which directly con-
tradicts the congressionally selected ten-day proration period of section
14(d) (6). 145
138 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
139 Cf Statement of SEC Comm'r Evans at the Conference on Securities Regulations in
Houston, Tex. (Dec. 12, 1979), reportedin SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 532, A-20 (rule 14e-
1 would affect "balance," because longer tender offer stays open, more likely it is that target
management can defeat it). In support of this minimum tender offer period, the SEC argued
that "[t]ender offers which do not stay open for a reasonable length of time increase the
likelihood of hasty ill-considered decision making. . . . The Commission therefore believes
that a minimum period of twenty business days is necessary." SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14,
at 1071. The proposals would "alleviate undue pressure on security-holders without unduly
hindering the person making a tender offer." Id Congress, however, had previously deter-
mined that the statutory withdrawal and proration periods would adequately serve those
same purposes. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2, at 3. The SEC argued that new develop-
ments rendered the statutory scheme inadequate. SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14, at 1053.
Nevertheless, an administrative agency cannot revise inadequate statutory provisions through
administrative rules. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970); Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944); see also SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at
57,680 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting) ("[Ihf the passage of time indicates changes are needed
in a congressionally established regulatory scheme, an agency must go to Congress, rather
than implement changes by regulation.").
140 SEC Rel. 18,761,supra note 18, at 24,341. In a letter attacking the proposed rule 14d-
9 (now revised rule 14d-8), the Securities Industry Association noted: "Although the proposed
rule has the refreshing virtue among regulatory initiatives of being only one sentence in
length, its simplicity is deceptive." Comment Letter of the Federal Regulations Committee of
the Securities Indus. Ass'n (Sept. 14, 1982) (in file No. S7-933, SEC Public Reference Room).
141 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
142 See supra note 6 (text of§ 14(d)(5)). But ef supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
143 Ste supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
144 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18; SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,679 n.2.
145 Compare § 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Where any person makes a tender offer. . . for less than all the outstand-
ing equity securities of a class, and where a greater number of securities is
deposited pursuant thereto within ten days . . . than such person is bound or
willing to take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as
nearly as may be pro rata. . . according to the number of securities deposited
by each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to securi-
ties deposited within ten days after notice of an increase in the consideration
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C. Supreme Court Interpretations of the Williams Act
In two cases, Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 146 and Edgar o. MITE
Corp. 147 the Supreme Court analyzed the Williams Act and the congres-
sional purposes behind it. 148 The Court's opinions undermine the SEC's
position with respect to its authority to enact substantive timing rules
and cast doubt upon the validity of these regulations.
1. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
In Piper, the Supreme Court examined the congressional purposes
underlying the Williams Act in deciding whether a defeated tender of-
feror had an implied private right of action under section 14(e) against
target management. Acknowledging that the statute was silent on the
private rights of tender offerors, the Court warned that "[r]eliance on
legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is . . . a step to be
taken cautiously."' 149 Chris-Craft and the SEC asserted that Congress
intended to establish "a policy of even-handedness in takeover legisla-
tion,"' 5 0 and that defeated tender offerors should have a private right of
action. 15 1 The Court dismissed this argument stating that "this policy
. . . does not go . . . to the purpose of the legislation;"' 5 2 rather, the
purpose was "solely to get needed information to the investor."' 53 The
Court concluded that the "sole purpose of the Williams Act was the
15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(6) (1982) (emphasis added); with revised rule 14d-8:
Nlotwithstanding the pro rata provision of Section 14(d)(6) of the Act, if any
person makes a tender offer . . . for less than all of the outstanding equity
securities of a class, and if a greater number of securities are deposited pursu-
ant thereto than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the
securities taken up and paid for shall be taken up and paid for as nearly as
may be pro rata ... according to the number of securities deposited by each
depositor during the period such offer ... remains open.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1983) (emphasis added).
146 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
147 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
148 See also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("Congress intended
to do no more than give incumbent management an opportunity to express and explain its
position. The Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for manage-
ment to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock .... "); San Fran-
cisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 692 F.2d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 1982)
("Congress drew the line between the interest in 'more information' and the interests of the
offeror in obtaining a quick decision when it established a minimum ten day proration period
149 Piper, 430 U.S. at 26.
150 Id. at 29.
151 This conclusion on a private right of action is the only contention rejected by the
Court. See inf/a text accompanying notes 155-57.
152 Piper, 430 U.S. at 29.
153 Id at 31. ( "Senator Williams articulated this singleness of purpose, even while advo-
cating neutrality: 'We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids. S 5/0 is designed soley to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors.' " Id (quoting 113 CONG. REG. 24,664
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added by Court)).
The Court's emphasis on the disclosure aspect of investor protection is significant and
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protection of investors" and that Chris-Craft had no implied cause of
action.1 54
Although Piper appears to negate the assertion that Congress in-
tended a policy of evenhandedness between bidders and target manage-
ment, this conclusion ignores most of Piper's discussion. For example,
the Court stated that "Congress was indeed committed to a policy of
neutrality in contests for control. . . .Neutrality is. . .one character-
istic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of
investors."' 55 The Court recognized that the congressionally selected
balance was crucial in " 'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the
takeover bidder' . . . without favoring either the tender offeror or ex-
isting management."' 56 Thus, while accepting the proposition of a con-
gressionally selected balance, the Court found that "the congressional
policy of 'evenhandedness' is nonprobative of the quite disparate propo-
sition that the Williams Act was intended to confer rights for money
damages upon an injured takeover bidder."' 57
Although a superficial reading of Piper tends to support the SEC's
position concerning the propriety of adjusting the timing provisions, a
full reading of Piper belies that conclusion. Moreover, the SEC's own
efforts to preempt state takeover laws has considerably weakened the
remaining strength of this interpretation.15
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
In June 1982, the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. MITE Corp., 159
and expressly reinforced Piper's implicit recognition of the congressio-
nally selected balance. In MITE, the Court struck down the Illinois
Business Takeover Law as a violation of the commerce clause.160 It held
that "the possible benefits of the potential delays required by the [Illi-
nois Business Takeover] Act may be outweighed by the increased risk
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by in-
cumbent management."' 6 1 Specifically, the Court affirmed the Seventh
shows that it accorded disclosure considerably more weight than the "congressional balance"
contained in the timing provisions. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that these twin
aspects of investor protection were not both at issue in Piper. Se in/ra text accompanying
notes 155-57.
154 Piper, 430 U.S. at 35.
155 Id at 29.
156 Id at 30 (citation omitted).
157 Id at 31.
158 In 1979, the SEC adopted rule 14d-2b, which created such a direct and substantial
conflict between the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulations and state takeover statutes
"as to make it impossible to comply with both." SEC Rel. 16,384, supra note 14, at 1060. The
SEC thus initiated a process in which federal regulations preempted many state takeover
laws. See in/ra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
159 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
160 Id at 643.
161 Id at 645.
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Circuit's finding 62 that these potential delays caused a substantial bur-
den on interstate commerce, by exceeding the timing requirements of
the Williams Act.163
Both sides to the litigation as well as the SEC as amicus presented
the critical issue as whether Congress intended the Williams Act to cre-
ate a definitive balance. 164 Throughout its amicus brief, the SEC in
uncompromising terms focused on the adverse effects of delay in tender
offers. The SEC argued that the Illinois law conflicted with the "free
market" approach that Congress endorsed in the Williams Act and dis-
turbed the congressionally selected "balance between the interests of af-
fected persons .... -165 The Illinois Act provided for preliminary
review and hearing by state officials but also included substantive tim-
ing provisions that conflicted with the statutory requirements of the
Williams Act. These provisions included a twenty-day minimum tender
offer period, a seventeen-day withdrawal period, and proration rights
throughout the tender offer period.166
A plurality of the Court agreed with the SEC and found congres-
sional intent to include a neutral balance. In Part III of the opinion, the
Court addressed Piper. "There is no question that in imposing these re-
quirements, Congress intended to protect investors. But it is also crystal
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to
avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."'' 6 7 The plu-
rality, as well as each concurrence, recognizes that delay harms neutral-
ity. Ironically, to support its substantive timing regulations, the SEC
must abandon the position successfully argued in MITE.
IV
THE INVALIDITY OF THE SEC SUBSTANTIVE TIMING RULES
FOR TENDER OFFERS
The SEC's substantive timing rules for tender offers either contra-
dict or ignore the congressionally selected balance of the Williams Act
and are invalid under administrative law principles. Until the rules are
judicially reviewed, they will continue to tip the balance of regulation in
favor of the target management contrary to the underlying intent of the
162 MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 502 (7th Cir. 1980).
163 MITE, 457 U.S. at 644-45.
164 Brief for Appellant at 17, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (critical issue
was whether Congress had intended for Williams Act to create "a definitive balance between
the offeror and incumbent management"); Brief for Appellee at 24, Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982) ("To achieve a neutral balance in the Williams Act which favored
neither an offeror nor target management, Congress adopted a 'market approach' . ...);
infra text accompanying note 165 (Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
165 Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 7, Edgar V. MITE.
166 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121.5, § 137.59, IT B, C, D (1978).
167 MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (citiations omitted).
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Williams Act. Congress should remove the uncertainty surrounding the
SEC's rulemaking authority for timing provisions of tender offers, and
reset the balance itself or clearly delegate such power to the SEC.
Rule 14d-8 directly contradicts the plain, unambiguous language of
section 14(d) (6). This alone should be sufficient to invalidate this regu-
lation. 16 The legislative history of section 14(d) (6) also undermines the
SEC's implicit position that the section merely establishes a minimum
period.169 In early drafts, the Williams Act provided for a full-length
proration period. Before enactment, however, Congress rejected full-
length proration and reduced the proration period to ten days.' 70
Rule 14d-7, although technically consistent with the language of
section 14(d) (5), is inconsistent with the reports accompanying the Wil-
liams Act that restrict the SEC's section 14(d)(5) rulemaking authority
to "special situations."1 71 Similarly, rule 14e-1, which requires a mini-
mum twenty business day tender offer period, is inconsistent with the de
facto tender offer periods of the Williams Act.' 72 Moreover, the hear-
ings and reports accompanying the Williams Act, as well as later, re-
lated bills, suggest that Congress intended both the withdrawal and
proration periods to be inflexible. 173
The SEC contends that in 1968 Congress did not foresee the
problems that attend the short proration period and that sections 23(a)
and 14(e) authorize it to promulgate substantive timing rules. 174 The
SEC, in enacting rule 14d-8, sought to correct the anomalous situation
in which shareholders faced with the "inordinately complex investment
decisions" surrounding a partial tender offer had ten days in which to
decide while those faced with "any and all" offers had at least fifteen
days.' 75 Yet this anomaly results from rule 14e-1.1 76 Moreover, to in-
voke section 14(e) requires a finding that "compliance with the express
10 day period of Section 14(d)(6) either is, or is at least closely akin to,
'fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative' activity." 77 The SEC failed to
make such showing; 178 it instead relied on the legislative history behind
168 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 26.
170 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 109-13.
174 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,679 n.2.
175 See Fogelson & Kapp, The Emergence of Proration Pools and Two-Tier O ers ar Desired
Structuresfor Acquisitionu, 1 FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INST. ON SEC REG. HANDBOOK 581, 606-
07 (1982); see also supra note 28.
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1983). Congress avoided such an anomalous result in the
Williams Act by making the proration period longer than the withdrawal period; 10 and
seven calendar days, respectively.
177 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,681 (Treadway, Comm'r, dissenting).
178 The SEC's broad interpretation of § 14(e) is longstanding. For example, in 1970, in
response to a request from the Senate to illustrate the fraudulent practices that the SEC
1983]
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the 1970 amendments to assert that Congress recognized the inadequacy
of the statutory scheme enacted two years earlier.1 79
Nor does section 23(a) provide adequate support for the SEC's ar-
gument.18 0 Section 23 (a) represents broad enabling legislation authoriz-
ing the SEC to implement the provisions of the Exchange Act. 18 ' For
this reason, perhaps, the SEC releases concerning rule 14d-8 refer to sec-
tion 23(a) only in footnotes. 182 To invoke section 23(a) as authority for
revised rule 14d-8 is questionable; implementing section 14(d)(6) does
not include rescinding it. 183 Such enabling provisions may often prompt
lenient judicial review of regulations' 18 4 but they cannot authorize ad-
ministrative lawmaking or rescission of statutory provisions by rule. 185
As noted above, if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
the discretion and power of an agency is circumscribed.' 8 6
CONCLUSION
The plain, unambiguous language of the Williams Act timing pro-
visions coupled with its legislative history preclude agency rulemaking
in this area. The SEC's timing regulations cause delay, which favors the
target management, contrary to Congress's mandate to avoid tipping
the balance of regulation in favor of either the tender offeror or target
might police with rules adopted pursuant to § 14(e), the SEC "came back with a list which
manifests an intention to read 14(e) as broadly as possible." Brown, The Scope ofthe Wilh'aim
Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAw. 1637, 1647 (1971). For the text of this list, see 1970
S. Hearings, supra note 75, at 12.
179 SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at 24,339.
180 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1982), provides:
The Commission . . . shall. . . have power to make such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this
chapter. . . or for the execution of the functions vested in fit] by this chapter,
and may for such purposes classify persons, securities, transactions, state-
ments, applications, reports, and other matters within their respective juris-
dictions, and prescribe greater, lesser or different requirements for different
classes thereof.
181 Id
182 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,679 n.2; SEC Rel. 18,761, supra note 18, at
24,339 n.10.
183 See Fogelson & Kapp, supra note 175, at 608-12. The authors describe in detail the
operation of the withdrawal and proration regulations and the current tender offer practices.
They also discuss the questionable statutory authority supporting revised rule 14d-8.
184 See supra note 46. In Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973), the Supreme Court recited a typical and now oft-quoted standard for judicial review
of agency rulemaking: "Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the
agency may 'make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act,' we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder
will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legisla-
tion.'" (footnote and citations omitted). The regulation, however, must not contradict the
terms of the statute. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 46.
186 See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
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management.18 7 These rules violate one of the primary purposes of the
Williams Act and interfere with Congress's "market approach"' 8 to in-
vestor protection. Moreover, at least two of the Rowan Court's 89 three
supplemental factors suggest the rule's invalidity. First, the rules were
promulgated more than twelve years after the statutory provisions they
"clarify."190 Second, Congress specifically endorsed the continuing im-
portance of the very short waiting period in tender offers that these rules
extended.' 9'
The only conclusion for a court presented with a challenge to the
SEC's substantive timing regulations is to find them invalid as an unrea-
sonable implementation of the congressional mandate. 9 2 If the passage
of time diminishes the effectiveness of the timing provisions and there-
fore requires changes "in a congressionally established regulatory
scheme, an agency must go to Congress, rather than implement changes
by regulation."19 3 Such a decision or agency request will encourage
Congress to eliminate the uncertainty that surrounds agency rulemaking
in this area.
Congress should resolve this uncertainty either by clearly removing
the statutory provisions from agency control or by expressly delegating
to the SEC the authority to promulgate such substantive regulations. In
light of the widespread revision of state takeover laws, it is particularly
important that Congress update the federal legislation to account for
187 See supra notes 152-53, 161 and accompanying text.
188 See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The
underlying purpose of the Williams Act is to protect investors. . . .Congress relied upon a
'market approach' to investor protection." Congress saw the importance of "avoiding regula-
tion that puts the investor at a disadvantage to incumbent management," recognizing "that
delay can seriously impede a tender offer."); see also MITE, 457 U.S. at 639 ("Congress antici-
pated investors and the takeover offeror to be free to go forward without unreasonable delay.
The potential for delay . . .upset[s] the balance struck by Congress. .. 2).
189 Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981); see supra note 54.
190 Congress enacted the Williams Act timing provisions in 1968; the § 14(e) rulemaking
authority in 1970. Rules 14d-7 and 14e-1 were promulgated in 1980; rule 14d-8 in 1982.
191 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
192 Cf United States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
Also consider San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 692
F.2d 814 (Ist Cir. 1982). The First Circuit reversed the district court's order that extended the
proration period:
Congress drew the line between the interest in "more information" and the
interests of the offeror in obtaining a quick decision when it established a
minimal ten day proration period in the Williams Act. Unless there is some
special circumstance related to the district court's determination of likely ille-
gality, we see no basis for changing the time limit that Congress enacted.
Id at 818.
193 SEC Rel. 19,336, supra note 18, at 57,680 (Shad, Chairman, dissenting), citing H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970) and Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 332 U.S.
607, 617 (1944).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
recent changes in tender offer takeover practices and the SEC's rulemak-
ing response. Congress must reset the balance.t94
W. Brewster Lee, III
194 The SEC announced that a full review of the tender offer rules will begin in March
1983. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1983, at D7, col. 3. The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Advisory Committee on Tender Offers issued its final report on July 8, 1983. See SECAdisovi
PanelIssues Report on Changes in Tender Ofer Laws, SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, 1339-40
(July 15, 1983); Ererpts From Fzal Report ofSECAdviso,7 Committee on Tender Ofers, SEC REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, 1375-81 (July 15, 1983).
[Vol. 68:914
